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Both German politicians and commentators have been talking about the extraordinary impor-
tance of the forthcoming European Parliament elections for the future of the EU. The expect-
ed decline in support for the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, combined with the 
gains expected for parties opposed to European integration, will lead to major changes in the 
way the parliament functions, and of the EU as a whole. The two largest European parties will 
probably not be capable of forming a stable coalition, and this in turn could affect who takes 
up the chief posts in the EU. 
The results of the European elections could have repercussions for the ability of the grand 
coalition in Berlin to survive, and decisions regarding individuals in the CDU and SPD. For the 
German parties, this election is also the most important test before the autumn elections in 
three eastern federal Länder – in Brandenburg, Saxony and Thüringen. In addition, on 26 May, 
at the same time as the European elections, elections will be held for seats in the regional 
parliament in Bremen. For the SPD, loss of power in this federal state would present a major 
challenge, because the Social Democrats have been in power there for 74 years. More severe 
conflict and debate can be expected as to whether the CDU/CSU and SPD are to continue rul-
ing collectively. If a minister of justice from the SPD wins a seat in the EP, this could lead to 
changes in Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government. It is possible that a reshuffle of Angela 
Merkel’s cabinet would involve appointment of CDU leader Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer. 
The election campaign in Germany
In Germany, the European elections will be 
linked to the elections to the Bremen regional 
parliament and a number of local councils. This 
will probably lead to a greater turnout (in 2014 
turnout was 48%, while the average turnout in 
the EU was 43%), but also means that local and 
regional issues will be part of the campaign. 
The main campaign issues are climate protec-
tion, the environment, and providing funding 
for RES. Some proposals being made relate di-
rectly to German politics, and not the system in 
the EU. This is true of the proposal to introduce 
a CO2 tax, which would be levied for instance on 
fuel. The revenue generated by this tax would 
speed up transformation of Germany’s energy 
sector. Other issues of interest to voters are mi-
gration, security, the national debt, and stabili-
ty of the euro1. 
Unlike the Bundestag and regional parliament 
elections, no minimum threshold applies in 
the EP elections. For German MEPs, apart from 
representatives of parties that hold seats in the 
Bundestag, this means that politicians in the Na-
tional Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), for 
1 Europas Bürger glauben trotz Krisen an die EU, „Die 
Welt“, YouGov poll in eight EU member states, https://
www.welt.de/politik /ausland/article193371401/WELT-
Umfrage-Deutsche-halten-Umweltschutz-fuer-groesste-
Herausforderung-der-EU.html
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which the EP is the most important forum for 
political activity (the party is not represented in 
the Bundestag or the regional parliaments), will 
also take up seats, as will politicians in largely 
unknown groupings, such as the Party for La-
bour, Rule of Law, Animal Protection, Promo-
tion of Elites and Grassroots Democratic Initi-
ative, or the Ecological Democratic Party. The 
fact that there is no threshold encourages the 
smaller groupings and initiatives to run, and 
this is why 41 parties and associations are reg-
istered for the elections (25 in 2014).
In Germany, there are 64.8 m registered voters 
(the largest number in the EU). This means that 
the result of the elections in Germany will have 
a major impact on the distribution of power in 
the EP. Voters in Germany determine the allo-
cation of 96 out of 751 seats (if Brexit should 
come to pass – 705). During the last parlia-
mentary term, German MEPs were represented 
in all of the political groups in the EP (see an-
nex). Some of the long-serving and influential 
MEPs are not seeking re-election (for instance 
CDU member Elmar Brok, who has held a seat 
since 1980, and former Greens leader Rebecca 
Harms). This will result in a younger generation 
of German members, but also affect the way 
the EP functions, where effectiveness largely 
depends on the length of service of MEPs, and 
the posts they hold. 
Test of the CDU leadership
For the Christian Democrats, the European 
elections will be the first leadership test since 
Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer took over leader-
ship of the CDU, and Markus Söder took over 
leadership of the CSU. The changes in these 
two parties have led to suppression of conflicts 
over personnel-related and manifesto policy 
between Angela Merkel and Horst Seehofer, 
and enabled a joint manifesto to be presented 
before EP elections for the first time in history. 
To date, joint manifestos were an issue reserved 
for domestic elections, while the CSU stressed 
a more conservative and Eurosceptic profile 
in a separate European manifesto2. The CDU’s 
healthy result (approximately 30% in the polls) 
will strengthen the new leader within the party 
and improve the Christian Democrats’ chances 
in the autumn regional parliament elections in 
the eastern part of Germany. In turn, if seats 
were to be lost in the EP and results were worse 
in Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thüringen, this 
would intensify the discussion within the par-
ty about Kramp-Karrenbauer’s leadership and 
strengthen her rivals (above all Friedrich Merz, 
who lost to Kramp-Karrenbauer in December 
2018, and Armin Laschet, the prime minister 
of Nordrhein Westfalen). The elections will also 
be a test of the leadership for the CSU, and 
a test ahead of the local government elections 
in March 2020. The outcome will reveal wheth-
er stressing pro-European elements of the man-
ifesto is an effective means for the CSU in the 
standoff with the AfD. 
Unlike in 2014, the Christian Democrats will not 
be pinning their hopes on Chancellor Merkel. 
Merkel is not featured on campaign posters 
and has not been attending election rallies. This 
could prove to be a misguided strategy. Merkel 
continues to be the most popular German poli-
tician, and 68% of Germans want her to stay in 
power until the end of the current Bundestag 
term, which ends in 20213.
A successful result for the German Christian 
Democrats will enable them to fight for key 
posts in the EU. Manfred Weber, a member of 
2 See K. Frymark, Wolny Kraj Bawaria, „Prace OSW”, 
15.04.2019, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/pra 
ce-osw/2019-04-15/wolny-kraj-bawaria
3 According to Politbarometer for ZDF of 10 May 2019.
The fact that there is no election thresh-
old encourages smaller groupings to run 
for seats. More than 40 parties and asso-
ciations have registered electoral lists. 
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the liberal wing of the CSU, is the candidate for 
the CSU, CDU, and the entire European People’s 
Party for EC president. His chances are under-
mined however by the sceptical approach of 
many European leaders to the idea of Spitzen-
kandidaten (leaders of the election campaigns 
of the European political parties tipped as can-
didates for the post of EC president). The Pres-
ident of France, Emmanuel Macron, objects to 
this procedure the most. Another area in which 
Weber is weak is lack of experience in govern-
ment; he is the deputy leader of the CSU and 
leader of the EPP fraction in the EP. 
Becoming EC President will depend on a range 
of factors, such as Weber’s and the EPP’s ability 
to form a broad coalition in the EP and alleviate 
the resistance in the European Council. Weber’s 
appointment might also be affected by the con-
flict over Fidesz’s membership of the EPP. Fidesz 
has already proven to be a major disruption for 
the Christian Democrats in the campaign before 
the European elections, primarily for the Bavar-
ian CSU, which collaborates with the Hungari-
ans4. It is also possible that one of the posts will 
go to a different representative of Germany, for 
example Jens Weidmann, head of the Bundes-
bank, who is named as a candidate for head of 
the European Central Bank. There is also contin-
uing speculation that Angela Merkel might take 
over the role of head of the European Council, 
although Merkel denies this. 
4 Ł. Frynia, R. Formuszewicz, The game to exclude Fidesz 
from the European People’s Party, „OSW Analyses”, 
13.03.2019, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/anal-
yses/2019-03-13/game-to-exclude-fidesz-european-peo-
ples-party
For the German Christian Democrats, one of the 
main tasks will be to maintain a strong position 
in the EPP, thereby retaining as much influence 
over the work of the EP as possible, for instance 
by gaining important posts (in EP committees, 
especially the EP Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
for example, which has been in the hands of 
the CDU since 1999, except for a break of five 
years, and posts in the EPP itself). 
The Christian Democrats’ model for European 
integration, much publicised during the elec-
tion campaign, is based on the principle of 
subsidiarity, which is to be controlled more ef-
ficiently. Manifesto speeches made have been 
critical of the excessive centralism and bureau-
cracy, and the vision of a European superstate 
has met with scepticism as well5. The head 
of the German Christian Democrats is in favour 
of the role of national states as a source of 
identification and democratic legitimisation, as 
well as the intergovernmental method, which 
she described as being an equally valid pillar 
in the decision-making process to the com-
munity method6. With regard to a common 
foreign and security policy, Kramp-Karren-
bauer said, a joint seat held by the EU on the 
UN Security Council would ensure operational 
capacity in the future. At the same time, she 
would like to see a European Security Council 
formed, involving the United Kingdom, and in 
addition the CDU and CSU want to broaden 
the scope of issues for which a qualified ma-
jority vote is required. The Christian Democrats 
emphasise their opposition to creating the 
post of minister of finance for the eurozone, 
5 Presented in the CDU election manifesto: Unser Eu-
ropa macht stark. Für Sicherheit, Frieden und Wohl-
stand, https://www.cdu.de/europaprogramm and in 
an article by Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer entitled 
Europa jetzt richtig machen, „Die Welt am Sonntag“, 
10.03.2019, https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/
article190037115/AKK-antwortet-Macron-Europa-
richtig-machen.html
6 R. Formuszewicz, Germany: Christian Democrats’ re-
sponse to Macron’s appeal to the citizens of Europe, 
„Analizy OSW”, 12.03.2019, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/analyses/2019-03-12/germany-christian-dem-
ocrats-response-to-macrons-appeal-to-citizens
The fall in support for the Christian Demo-
crats and Social Democrats, and strength-
ened position of parties opposed to Euro-
pean integration, will radically change the 
way the EP functions.
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and rule out the possibility of Germany being 
part of a transfer union. According to the Chris-
tian Democrats, confirmation of the current 
rules on fair competition in the EU should be 
accompanied by an assurance that European 
businesses will continue to be competitive in re-
lation to outside monopolistic entities that ben-
efit from protectionism on the part of the coun-
try of origin. The Christian Democrats have said 
that they are in favour of keeping the current 
budget for the common agricultural policy and 
keeping in place the main principles of distribu-
tion of funds on the basis of direct subsidies.  
SPD – social reform programme
Unlike since 2014, and unlike the Christian 
Democrats, the German Social Democrats can-
not support their campaign using their own, 
main European Socialist Party candidate. This 
role has fallen to the Vice-President of the EC, 
Frans Timmermans, who is from the Nether-
lands. This time, the SPD campaign is headed 
by the incumbent minister for justice, Katarina 
Barley, who only has experience in domestic 
politics. On the other hand, the other main SPD 
candidate, Udo Bullman, does have the profile 
of a European politician. He is currently head of 
the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Dem-
ocrats in the EP.
The forecasts for the SPD are not good. The re-
sult is expected to be considerably less than the 
27% gained in the 2014 EP elections, and even 
lower than the historical failure in the Bunde-
stag elections in 2017 (20.5%). The SPD will 
therefore be weakened twofold in the coming 
parliamentary term – due to both a poorer gen-
eral result of the European social democrats, 
and due to Germany having less representation 
in that political group. The party is still paying 
the political cost of a dispute over the co-crea-
tion of another grand coalition with the Chris-
tian Democrats following the 2017 Bundestag 
elections. 
The attempt to curb the decline in popularity 
was based, at the beginning of 2019, on social 
welfare initiatives, and this was also included 
as an element of the manifesto for the EP elec-
tions7. The SPD is in favour of a social Europe as 
a counter-vision to neo-liberal ideas. The SPD’s 
most important policies include introducing 
a minimum wage in all member states, meas-
ures to converge pay and social security sys-
tems, and improving employment conditions 
and labour law standards. The Social Democrats 
are proposing creating a European reinsurance 
fund as a contingency measure in the event 
a crisis leads to a deterioration of conditions 
on the labour market in member states. They 
seek a larger role for the EU in tax policy, in 
particular abolishing member states’ veto and 
fundamentally expanding the scope of issues 
for which a qualified majority vote is required.
The SPD wants to see further integration, above 
all in the eurozone. In its manifesto, it recom-
mends making use of options provided for in 
treaties for a narrower group of member states 
to work together more closely. The eurozone 
budget, pushed through by France, has the 
SPD’s support. This budget was intended to be 
used for investment and stabilisation. The SPD 
is also promoting the idea of appointing an eco-
nomic government and minister of finance for 
the eurozone in the future. The European Sta-
bility Mechanism (ESM) would be transformed 
into the European Currency Fund. One note-
worthy element is a declaration of readiness 
to increase Germany’s financial contribution 
7 SPD election manifesto: Kommt zusammen und macht 
Europa stark!, Wahlprogramm SPD, https://www.spd.
de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Europa_ist_die_Antwort /
SPD_Europaprogramm_2019.pdf
For the Christian Democrats, the EP elec-
tions will be the first test of the new lead-
ership – Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer in 
the CDU and Markus Söder in the CSU.
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to the EU budget, which would also be funded 
by a financial transaction tax. At the same time, 
access to EU funds is to be linked to observance 
of the principle of the rule of law, and a further 
long-term financial framework would be used to 
a greater extent for social policy goals. As part 
of the reform of the common agricultural pol-
icy, a proposal has been put forward to make 
payments conditional upon meeting social, en-
vironmental, and labour law standards. Regions 
and municipalities that agree to take in refugees 
are to have access to a special fund to support 
integration and communal development.
The German Social Democrats took the term 
“European sovereignty” over from Emmanuel 
Macron, and are suggesting that it be achieved 
by reinforcing common foreign policy, putting 
an end to the unanimity requirement, strength-
ening the position of the High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, and obtaining a seat for the EU on the 
UN Security Council in the future. The SPD has 
also taken advantage of the EP elections to re-
new its proposals for arms control. It has said 
that it supports the vision of a common Europe-
an army, under parliamentary control – and this 
would also be a solution to a “resurgence of 
nationalism”. The SPD is proposing changes to 
the EP: giving it a right of legislative initiative, 
creating a new defence committee, allowing it 
full involvement in adoption of EU legislation 
on taxation, and expanding its monitoring 
and investigative powers. The SPD supports 
developing the principle of Spitzenkandidaten 
who are on transnational electoral lists. The EP 
would also have the option of asking for a vote 
of no confidence in individual EC members, and 
not just with respect to a whole college. 
Upward trend for the Greens 
The Greens have the greatest support among 
of all the political parties (up 10 p.p. compared 
to the EP elections in 2014). Having achieved an 
average result of 19% in the polls, the Greens 
are now potentially the second most powerful 
political group in Germany. The EP elections 
will be a means of verifying the increase in their 
political standing. To date, their support came 
primarily from a change of leadership and sup-
pression of infighting, the continuing crisis in 
the SPD, tension in the grand coalition, and 
lack of involvement in the federal government, 
which has weakened the Social Democrats, for 
example. The main topic of the election cam-
paign, environmental and climate protection, 
which Germans consider the most important 
task faced by the EU, will help improve the 
Greens’ result. Maintaining a high level of sup-
port both in the EP elections and the elections 
to the regional parliament in Bremen, where 
the Greens would like to remain in a coalition 
with the SPD, will help strengthen the party in 
the regional parliament elections in the eastern 
regions of Germany. In Brandenburg, Saxony, 
and Thüringen, where to date they have not 
been very well established, the Greens can ex-
pect support of between 7 and 12%, according 
to opinion polls. 
The higher number of seats than that gained 
in 2014 in the EP will strengthen the German 
Greens within their own political group. This 
could also lead to greater influence in the new 
structure of the coalition, although lack of 
a representative in the European Council con-
tinues to be a fundamental weakness. Greater 
representation of the Greens in the EP could 
enable them to exert a greater influence on the 
subjects discussed and the conclusions reached. 
This is true not only of environmental issues, but 
also for example policy on Russia. The Greens 
The expected poorer overall result of the 
European Social Democrats and the re-
duced number of seats held by Germans 
in this political group will weaken the SPD 
twofold.
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have been critical of the policies of the Russian 
authorities, support keeping in place EU sanc-
tions imposed following the annexation of the 
Crimea and aggression in Ukraine, and are op-
posed to Nord Stream 2.
In the election manifesto adopted in Novem-
ber 2018, and during the campaign, the Greens 
stated that they supported making EU deci-
sion-making more efficient8. One of the ways 
in which the EU would become more efficient 
would be expanding the scope of issues for 
which a qualified majority vote is required in 
the European Council to include foreign, se-
curity, climate, and fiscal policy. The party 
would like to see the EP given greater powers 
in the form of legislative initiative, retaining 
the Spitzenkandidaten procedure, and powers 
in the appointment of directors of the Euro-
pean Monetary Fund, should this fund be set 
up in the future. In the Greens’ view, the EC 
should incorporate a parity system for women 
into commissioner appointments. The Greens 
agree that EU treaties could be amended if the 
amendments were drawn up by a convention 
created for this purpose and approved in a Eu-
rope-wide referendum. The party is in favour 
of an integration model that promotes more 
intense cooperation between selected coun-
tries (above all Germany and France), but which 
would essentially be inclusive. This applies for 
instance to the eurozone budget, which would 
potentially be open to all EU member states. 
8 The Greens‘ election manifesto: Europas Versprech-
en erneuern, Wahlprogramm Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 
https://cms.gruene.de/uploads/documents/2019_Europ-
awahl-Programm.pdf
In their manifesto, the Greens emphasise al-
location of EU funds for climate protection, 
renewable energy, funding for more impover-
ished regions and ecological agriculture, and 
new areas of social expenditure, for example to 
make young unemployed people occupationally 
active. Financing the common agricultural pol-
icy would do more to bring about a change in 
the agricultural model from large-scale indus-
try to smaller, more environmentally-friendly 
crops and livestock. The Greens would also like 
to see a fund created (as part of agricultural 
policy) for environmental protection in agri-
culture of €15 billion per year. This new area 
of spending would be financed by increasing 
the contribution from the current level of 1% 
of member states’ GDP to 1.2% of GDP, and in-
creasing EU revenue in the form of new taxes 
(digital, on CO2 emissions, and on the largest 
corporations). If Brexit takes place, the Greens 
will demand that the budget is replenished by 
increasing contributions. 
AfD – repeat debut
Support for the AfD in the opinion polls re-
mains at a level similar to that of the 2017 Bun-
destag elections, of 12.6%. The party can thus 
be expected to gain a result in double figures, 
considerably higher than 7.1%, which in 2014 
gave the party, existing for a mere year at that 
time, seven seats. By the end of the term, the 
AfD only had one of those seats left, due to 
infighting, division, and secession. Five former 
MEPs in the AfD – including the founder, Bernd 
Lucke – departed in 2015. In 2017, following 
the former co-leader of the party, Frauke Petry, 
Marcus Pretzell left the party. Presently, from 
the AfD, a seat is held in the EP by co-leader 
Jörg Meuthen, who is in charge of running the 
election campaign. He has relatively little ex-
perience in Brussels and Strasbourg, however, 
because he did not replace Beatrix von Storch, 
who was elected to the Bundestag, until the 
beginning of 2018. The AfD is therefore starting 
in the EP as a novice.
The increase in the number of seats at-
tained in the EP will make the German 
Greens stronger in their political group. 
Not having a representative in the Europe-
an Council will remain however a funda-
mental weakness of the European Greens.
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Although in comparison to the ratings of Eu-
rosceptic parties in other EU countries the AfD 
does not have a lot of support, it could play an 
important role in a potential parliamentary alli-
ance between them. In the EP, the AfD initially 
collaborated with the Tories and was a mem-
ber of the European Conservatives and Reform-
ists, but towards the end of the term it only 
had one MEP, belonging to Europe of Freedom 
and Direct Democracy. This will probably not 
be established again in the new term. In April 
2019, the AfD announced it was joining Italian 
Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini’s initia-
tive, and, as part of the European Alliance of 
Peoples and Nations, is to continue collaborat-
ing among others with Austria’s Freedom Party. 
At the same time, close links with the Austrians 
could discourage AfD voters due to release of 
controversial recordings of FPÖ politicians. 
In its manifesto, the AfD uses the slogan “Europe 
of Nations” to demand fundamental reform of 
the EU and a departure from the concept of 
federation9. The AfD’s most radical proposals 
are those concerning abolition of the EP as an 
undemocratic institution, leaving the eurozone, 
and even Germany leaving the EU if far-reaching 
reform of the EU proves impossible. It is in-
dicative that members of the AfD themselves 
modify this proposal due to the overriding sup-
port for EU membership in Germany. Accord-
ing to opinion polls, 80% of Germans would 
vote to stay in the event of a hypothetical Dexit 
9 AfD election manifesto: Programm der Alternative für 
Deutschland für die Wahl zum 9. Europäischen Parla-
ment 2019, https://www.afd.de/wp-content/uploads/
sites/111/2019/03/AfD_Europawahlprogramm_A5-
hoch_web_150319.pdf
referendum. Opinion polls say that supporters 
of the AfD are divided over this issue – half are 
in favour of Dexit10. 
The party is opposed to further integration 
within the economic and monetary union, to 
strengthening the ESM, and expanding the 
banking union. It has rejected the idea of ap-
pointing a European finance minister, taxes set 
at European level, and coordination and har-
monisation of social policy. According to the 
AfD, the EU budget should be reduced, and this 
includes by limiting spending on cohesion pol-
icy. The multiannual financial framework is to 
be agreed upon not for a period of seven years, 
but to correlate with the five-year EP term. With 
respect to the methods of settling the major 
European issues, the AfD is demanding that 
referenda be held.
Asylum and migration policy, including return-
ing these powers to the states and abolishing 
the Schengen area, is a major element of the 
party’s manifesto. A position clearly at variance 
with the other political forces with respect to 
migration firstly assured the AfD revival fol-
lowing the split in 2015, followed by success 
in the regional parliamentary elections and 
Bundestag elections. In the current EP election 
campaign, the migration issue was however 
overshadowed by debates over climate policy, 
and eurozone issues were also pushed further 
down the agenda. The AfD’s denial of human 
impact on the climate is at odds with the public 
mood in Germany, where 34% of respondents 
say that climate protection is the greatest chal-
lenge the EU will face in the future, while the 
second greatest challenge is migration (32%)11.
FDP back in the game
German liberals did not fully exploit their suc-
cessful return to the Bundestag in 2017 (10.7%). 
The breaking off of talks with the Christian 
Democrats and the Greens cost them support. 
10 Markus Wehner, Nachlassende Wirkung, „FAZ“, 15.05.2019.
11 YouGov poll - see footnote 2.
The most radical proposals are those of 
the AfD concerning abolishing the Euro-
pean Parliament and leaving the eurozone. 
They also want major European issues to 
be decided by way of a referendum.
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The EP elections are an opportunity for the FDP 
in two ways: the party will probably improve 
on its 2014 result (3.4%), and by the same to-
ken will gain more seats in the EP. In addition, 
the FDP now has new political capabilities due 
to the alliance of the European liberals in ALDE 
with President Macron. The party is one of 
eight formations that began working together 
more closely on 11 May in Strasbourg. These 
include the French “La Renaissance“ (from La 
République en Marche – LREM) and the Span-
ish Ciudadanos, the Dutch D66, the Hungar-
ian Momentum, Belgian MR, Austrian Neos, 
and Dutch VVD. These have the common ob-
jective of forming a political group in the EP, 
which, forecasts say, would have approximately 
100 seats and could be strengthened by other 
groupings or individual MEPs. Secretary Gener-
al Nicola Beer, one of seven leaders of the Euro-
pean liberals’ campaign, (together with Danish 
Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestag-
er) became the face of the FDP campaign.
The manifesto of the German liberals states that 
they are in favour of a federal vision of the EU12. 
They support creating a European convention 
to devise a new European constitution. They 
have proposed a review of powers in line with 
the principle of subsidiarity, and strengthen-
ing oversight of compliance with this principle. 
Their policies also include legislative initiative 
for the EP, a Europe-wide list of EP candidates, 
12 FDP election manifesto: Europas Chancen Nutzen. Wahl-
programm FDP, https://www.fdp.de/sites/default/files/
uploads/2019/04/30/fdp-europa-wahlprogramm-a5.pdf
greater transparency in the decision-making 
process in the Council, reducing the EC, and 
prevalence of legislation in the form of direc-
tives over regulations.
With regard to economic policy, the FDP sup-
ports further expansion of the internal market. 
It is proposing a new stability pact for the eu-
rozone, transformation of the ESM into a Euro-
pean Monetary Fund, and greater integration 
of capital markets. It has rejected the idea of 
a transfer union, and is proposing that depos-
its in the banking union be secured by way of 
a national mechanism. It is demanding reform 
of the EU budget to make it more efficient, 
without a change in quantity. The structure of 
the budget is to be reorganised through inte-
gration of instruments that have been separate 
to date, and abolition of discounts. Research, 
innovation, and digitalisation will take priority 
in the allocation of spending. With regard to 
foreign policy, on which liberals focus in par-
ticular, there is support for an EU foreign min-
ister and applicability of a qualified majority in 
decision-making. They are in favour of a Euro-
pean army, adopt a pro-integration line with 
regard to migration and asylum policy, and 
seek strengthening of Frontex.
Divided left
For the Left, the EP elections will mainly mobilise 
the party’s voters ahead of the autumn regional 
parliament elections, which are much more im-
portant for this grouping. The support given in 
the polls in the region of 6 or 7% is below the 
party’s expectations (in the 2014 elections the 
Left gained 7.4%). This fall in the party’s ratings 
is due primarily to a negative election campaign 
pointing out the weakness of the EU, and in-
ternal divisions in the grouping (with regard to 
manifesto and individuals, including the deci-
sion of Sahra Wagenknecht, one of the most 
recognisable Left activists, not to run again for 
the leadership of the fraction in the Bundestag). 
Most of German society is in favour of 
the EU, Germany’s membership of the EU, 
and a single currency. EU institutions also 
enjoy a level of trust among German re-
spondents that is higher than the Europe-
an average.
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The Left has chosen the younger generation of 
politicians (Özlem Demirel and Martin Schird-
ewan) to head the campaign, but this has not 
made the party more recognisable or led to an 
increase in support. 
In its manifesto, the Left proposes increasing 
the EP’s powers for instance in the form of un-
limited right of legislative initiative and broad-
er control of the EP over the ECB13. In addition, 
it seeks a European referendum (but does not 
state the formal requirements). The Left consid-
ers subsidiarity and strengthening of regions 
(among other things in the form of funding for 
local authorities that take in refugees) as an 
overriding EU principle. The grouping would 
like to see the EU budget allocated in a way that 
focusses on fighting unemployment among 
young people, security for unemployment, and 
increased welfare spending. The Left is in fa-
vour of increasing spending on renewable en-
ergy sources and transportation infrastructure, 
and universal involvement of EU citizens in dig-
itisation. 
Stability in European politics, 
unknown factors in domestic politics
The broad pro-integration consensus of the 
German political parties corresponds to the 
positive view taken by most of German socie-
ty towards the EU, Germany’s EU membership, 
and a single currency. EU institutions also enjoy 
a higher level of trust on the part of German 
respondents than the European average. At the 
same time, there is greater support for Europe-
an integration than five years ago14. Also, opin-
ion polls reveal that in recent years the number 
13 Left election manifesto: Für ein solidarisches Europa der 
Millionen, gegen eine Europäische Union der Millionäre, 
Wahlprogramm DIE LINKE, https://www.die-linke.de/
fileadmin/download/wahlen2019/wahlprogramm_pdf/
Europawahlprogramm_2019_-_Partei_DIE_LINKE.pdf
14 F. Mayer, Die neue Europafreundlichkeit, Politik & Kom-
munikation, 10.05.2019, https://www.politik-kommu-
nikation.de/ressorts/artikel/die-neue-europafreundlich-
keit-169978647
of people in favour of maintaining the status 
quo has risen to 33% (25% in 2012), while sup-
port for further integration and transfer of 
powers at European level remains at 17% (20% 
in 2012)15. The favourable view of the EU on the 
part of Germans is also reflected by a higher 
turnout for EP elections than the EU average. It 
remains to be seen whether discussions on the 
fateful nature of this year’s elections will mean 
greater voter mobilisation. 61% of respondents 
consider the forthcoming elections to be im-
portant, while among supporters of the Greens 
this number is 83%, PD – 78%, and the CDU – 
76%16. For the German parties, it is important 
to win over voters in the Bremen elections, to 
be held on the same day, and in numerous mu-
nicipal elections. At the same time, groupings 
that support European integration are trying to 
prevent the AfD becoming stronger, using to 
this end in particular the recordings that were 
compromising for the FPÖ, released one week 
before the elections, and the fiasco in the ruling 
coalition in Austria, of which it is part.
For all of the groupings, the EP elections are 
a general test prior to the autumn elections in 
three länder in the east. The outcome of the 
EP elections will be a method of gauging sup-
port, which can be used to examine the lead-
ership capabilities of the ruling parties and an 
argument in the discussion about the future of 
the grand coalition. The pressure on the SPD 
authorities to leave the coalition with the CDU 
will grow along with the expected poor results 
in the next elections to be held this year. Review 
of the coalition agreement, scheduled for the 
end of the year, and the SPD conference sched-
uled for December, will be a pretext for leaving 
the government. In such a situation it is possible 
that Kramp-Karrenbauer will be given the task 
15 IP-Forsa-Frage, 03/2019, https://zeitschrift-ip.dgap.org/ 
de/ip-die-zeitschrift /archiv/jahrgang-2019/mai-juni 
-2019/ip-forsa-frage-032019
16 Die Mehrheit der Deutschen findet die Europawahl 
wichtig für Deutschland, 16.05.2019, https://yougov.de/
news/2019/05/16/die-mehrheit-der-deutschen-findet-
die-europawahl-w/
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German MEPs in political groups in the eighth European Parliament (2014-2019)
Political group Number of MEPs Number of MEPs from Germany
European People’s Party 215 34
Progressive Alliance of Socialists & Democrats 184 27
European Conservatives and Reformists 77 6
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe 69 4
European United Left / Nordic Green Left 52 8
European Greens / European Free Alliance 52 13
Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy 42 1
Europe of Nations and Freedom 36 1
Non-attached 20 2
Source: own list formulated on the basis of data published by the EP, valid as at 21.05.2019, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/
ANNEX
of forming a government within the new coa-
lition. The coalition would probably be joined 
by the Greens and the FDP. Elections might also 
be held early, especially if coalition talks with 
new partners fail, and this would benefit the 
Greens, who have had a record increase in sup-
port in the polls, and currently have the small-
est fraction in the Bundestag.
